New-Keynesian Models and Monetary Policy: A Reexamination of the Stylized Facts by Söderström, Ulf et al.
New-Keynesian Models and Monetary Policy:
A Reexamination of the Stylized Facts
Ulf S¨ oderstr¨ om Paul S¨ oderlind Anders Vredin∗
August 2003
Abstract
Using an empirical New-Keynesian model with optimal discretionary mon-
etary policy, we calibrate key parameters—the central bank’s preference pa-
rameters; the degree of forward-looking behavior in the determination of inﬂa-
tion and output; and the variances of inﬂation and output shocks—to match
some broad characteristics of U.S. data. Our preferred parameterizations all
imply a small concern for output stability but a large preference for inter-
est rate smoothing, and a small degree of forward-looking behavior in price-
setting but a large degree of forward-looking in the determination of output.
We provide some intuition for these results and discuss their consequences for
practical monetary policy analysis.
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Many analyses of monetary policy presented in recent years have been based on
the hypothesis that the private sector’s behavior can be approximated by aggregate
supply and demand relations derived from so-called New-Keynesian models.1 This
is true both for analyses primarily aimed at describing how monetary policy has
been conducted, and for analyses intended to provide policy recommendations. The
popularity of the New-Keynesian framework in both theoretical and applied work
is easy to grasp: while being similar in structure to traditional models used for
policy analysis (such as the IS/LM model), it can (under certain assumptions) be
derived from microeconomic theory with optimizing agents. It therefore facilitates
communication between policymakers and more theoretically oriented researchers.
Since analytical solutions are often not available for this kind of models, and the
empirical literature has not yet reached a consensus about key parameters in the
model, researchers tend to rely on calibrated models. It is not entirely clear, however,
whether these calibrated models are suitable for policy analysis, that is, whether
they ﬁt the data. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine whether a
New-Keynesian model can be calibrated to match the broad characteristics of U.S.
data.
We use a framework (based on Rudebusch, 2002a) where the private sector’s
behavior is assumed to be described by a model with New-Keynesian features and
where the central bank is assumed to solve a well-deﬁned optimization problem.
We examine how certain changes in the central bank’s preferences or the private
sector’s behavior aﬀect the time-series properties of inﬂation, the nominal interest
rate and the output gap, and we calibrate the model to ﬁt some broad stylized facts
about ﬂuctuations in the U.S. economy. Although the model parameters are not
determined by estimation, we show that certain parameter combinations are more
consistent with the data than others.
Our analysis sheds some light on several issues that have recently been discussed
in the literature. For instance, empirical estimates of Taylor rules typically suggest
that central banks have very strong preferences for smoothing nominal interest rates
1Early references on how to derive such models from optimizing behavior include McCallum and
Nelson (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Clarida et al. (1999) review this literature.
To our knowledge there is no generally agreed set of restrictions that characterize models that
are presented under the New-Keynesian label. Theoretical models are of course more sparsely
parameterized than empirical models. We use the New-Keynesian label because the model that we
apply is similar to many earlier models of aggregate supply and demand that have been presented
as New-Keynesian.
1(e.g., Clarida et al., 2000). Although arguments for why such a policy may be opti-
mal have been presented (see, e.g., Cukierman, 1991; Goodfriend, 1991; Woodford,
1999), it has also been argued that there is little deliberate interest rate smoothing
in practice and that the empirical Taylor rules are misspeciﬁed descriptions of mon-
etary policy (see Rudebusch, 2002b). In our model with optimal monetary policy,
the Taylor rule is indeed misspeciﬁed. Nevertheless, our results indicate that a good
approximation of central bank behavior can be obtained assuming a large preference
for interest rate smoothing but virtually no preference for output stabilization.
Ad i ﬀ e r e n ti s s u ec o n c e r n st h ei m p o r t a n c eo ff o r w a r d -v e r s u sb a c k w a r d - l o o k i n g
behavior in private agents’ decision rules. Many studies of monetary policy are
based on the presumption that the private sector is entirely backward-looking (e.g.,
Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Dennis, 2001b; Favero and Rovelli, 2001), raising
concerns about the Lucas critique. At the same time, purely forward-looking models
have been shown to have diﬃculties explaining the persistence in the data (see e.g.,
Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002). Our analysis stresses the fact
that the time-series properties of inﬂation (and other variables in the economy)
are aﬀected by both private behavior and monetary policy; therefore answers to
questions like those above depend crucially on the assumptions made about the
behavior of both central banks and the private sector. For example, we show that
the degree of forward-looking behavior in price-setting has important consequences
not only for the persistence of inﬂation, but also for the volatility of output and the
interest rate. Likewise, the ability to explain the persistence of inﬂation depends
not only on the degree to which price setters are forward-looking, but also on the
objectives of the central bank.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by presenting some styl-
ized facts for the U.S. economy in Section 2. Section 3 presents the model and the
main results from our calibration exercise, while Section 4 compares our preferred
calibration with alternative parameterizations. Section 5 goes through some robust-
ness exercises. Section 6 summarizes our results and discusses the consequences for
practical monetary policy analysis.
2 Stylized facts for the U.S. economy
This section presents some stylized facts for the U.S. economy, in terms of standard
deviations and autocorrelations for inﬂation, the output gap, and the 3-month in-
terest rate. These facts will serve as a benchmark with which we want to compare
2Figure 1: Data series, 1987Q4–1999Q4
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (inﬂation); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (output and
interest rate).
the implications of the theoretical model in Section 3. We use quarterly data for
the period from 1987Q4 to 1999Q4. This sample excludes the disinﬂationary period
of the early 1980s, and is characterized by a rather stable monetary policy regime.
It also matches the period used by Rudebusch (2002b) when analyzing recent U.S.
monetary policy.
The inﬂation rate is the annualized quarterly change in the GDP deﬂator (sea-
sonally adjusted), obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The output gap
is the percent deviation of real GDP (measured in chained 1996 dollars, seasonally
adjusted) from potential GDP, as calculated by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce
(see Congressional Budget Oﬃce, 1995). The interest rate is the (annualized) av-
erage of daily rates on a 3-month T-bill. Data on interest rates and potential and
actual GDP were obtained from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. The data series are shown in Figure 1. Table 1 shows the standard
deviations and autocorrelations for each series, with standard errors in parentheses.
The output gap and the interest rate are both more volatile (in terms of standard
deviations) and more persistent than the inﬂation rate.
It is often observed that the large persistence in the interest rate (the instrument
of monetary policy) cannot be explained by persistence in inﬂation and output alone.
3Table 1: Standard deviations and autocorrelations in U.S. data
Standard Autocorrelations
deviation 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags
Inﬂation 1.04 0.65 0.53 0.54
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10)
Output gap 1.67 0.91 0.83 0.75
(0.15) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13)
Interest rate 1.51 0.94 0.86 0.74
(0.18) (0.05) (0.10) (0.14)
Note: Quarterly U.S. data, 1987Q4–1999Q4. Standard errors in parentheses are based on GMM
and the delta method, using a Newey and West (1987) estimator with one lag.
Table 2: Estimated Taylor rule
Coeﬃcient Statistics
γ0 γπ γy ρi R2 σζ
0.793 1.615 0.959 0.711 0.965 0.350
(0.779) (0.286) (0.129) (0.076)
Note: Quarterly U.S. data, 1987Q4–1999Q4. Standard errors in parentheses are based on the delta
method, using a Newey and West (1987) estimator with two lags.
This is conﬁrmed for our sample by Table 2, which shows the results from estimating
a Taylor-type rule of the form
it =( 1− ρi)[γ0 + γπ¯ πt + γyyt]+ρiit−1 + ζt, (1)
where it is the 3-month interest rate, ¯ πt =1 /4
 3
j=0 πt−j is the four-quarter inﬂation
rate and yt is the output gap. The estimates imply long-run response coeﬃcients of
inﬂation and the output gap of 1.62 and 0.96, respectively, but the short-run eﬀects
are dominated by the lagged interest rate, which has a coeﬃcient of 0.71.2
3 Model and calibration
Our main purpose is to examine whether the stylized facts presented in Table 1 can
be explained by a New-Keynesian model framework. The standard New-Keynesian
model (surveyed by Clarida et al., 1999) is attractive in that it is derived from
2While these results are fairly standard in the literature (cf. Clarida et al., 2000), they are very
sensitive to the choice of sample period. Excluding the ﬁrst two years of data from the sample, the
estimated coeﬃcient of inﬂation falls to 0.69. The only coeﬃcient that seems robust to the choice
of sample period is that of the lagged interest rate, which is consistently estimated to be around
0.70.
4microfoundations and is sparsely parameterized. However, it is well-known that this
simple model has problems when confronted with the data, and additional inertia is
often introduced in practical applications (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1999; Estrella and
Fuhrer, 2002). For our purposes we need a model that has the potential of matching
the stylized facts for the U.S. economy. Therefore we choose the speciﬁcation of
Rudebusch (2002), which is an empirical model in the New-Keynesian tradition,
and we extend this model to allow for varying degrees of forward-looking behavior
in the determination of both inﬂation and output.3 We close the model by assuming
that the central bank chooses a path for the short-term interest rate to minimize
(under discretion) a standard objective function. Thus, the model is given by the
following three equations:4
πt = µπEt−1¯ πt+3 +( 1− µπ)
4  
j=1
απjπt−j + αyyt−1 + εt, (2)
yt = µyEt−1yt+1 +( 1− µy)
2  
j=1
βyjyt−j − βr [it−1 − Et−1¯ πt+3]+ηt, (3)
min
{it}
Var [¯ πt]+λVar [yt]+νVar [∆it]. (4)
Equation (2) is an empirical version of a New-Keynesian Phillips curve (or ag-
gregate supply equation), where inﬂation depends on expected and lagged inﬂation,
the output gap of the previous period, and the “cost-push shock” εt. Equation (3)
is an aggregate demand equation (or consumption Euler equation) that determines
the output gap as a function of the expected and lagged output gap, the real short-
term interest rate of the previous period, and the demand shock ηt. Equation (4)
is the objective function for monetary policy; the central bank acts to minimize the
weighted unconditional variances of inﬂation, the output gap, and the change in
the interest rate. The target level for inﬂation is normalized to zero, while that of
output is given by the potential level, so the target for the output gap is also zero.
3The main speciﬁcation of Rudebusch (2002a) allows for forward-looking behavior in the deter-
mination of inﬂation, but not output. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Ireland (2001), Christiano
et al. (2001), and Smets and Wouters (2002), among others, estimate New-Keynesian models with
better microfoundations for private behavior. In comparison to our model, they do not model
central bank behavior as optimizing, but specify a Taylor-type rule for monetary policy. Also,
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Ireland (2001) introduce persistence only through serially
correlated shocks.
4Rudebusch (2002b) uses a similar model, with forward-looking behavior in both inﬂation,
output, and the real interest rate. We choose a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation, since his model
includes expected future interest rates, and therefore cannot be easily mapped into the standard
linear RE framework (see, e.g., S¨ oderlind, 1999). Dennis (2001a) suggests an alternative RE
framework that is able to handle such model speciﬁcations.
5Table 3: Parameter values
Inﬂation Output gap
απ1 0.67 βy1 1.15
απ2 −0.14 βy2 −0.27
απ3 0.40 βr 0.09
απ4 0.07
αy 0.13
Note: Parameters estimated by Rudebusch (2002a) on quarterly U.S. data, 1968Q3–1996Q4.
Therefore, although we assume that the central bank acts under discretion, there is
no inﬂation bias, but inﬂation is on average equal to the target.5
Because we want to focus on speciﬁc aspects of New-Keynesian models and cer-
tain facts (i.e., the volatility and persistence of inﬂation, output and the interest
rate), we have chosen to take certain parameter estimates for granted and to cal-
ibrate the remaining parameters to replicate the moments we are interested in as
closely as possible. Thus, we choose to estimate those parameters that are cru-
cial for the moments of interest: the importance of forward-looking behavior in the
determination of inﬂation and output (µπ and µy), the relative weights in the cen-
tral bank’s objective function (λ and ν), and the standard deviation of supply and
demand shocks (σπ,σ y). For the other parameters we simply use the estimates of
Rudebusch (2002a), shown in Table 3.6
The ideal way to match theory and facts remains a controversial issue. It is
well known that point estimates using maximum likelihood methods can be fairly
sensitive to small changes in the sample or estimation method (see, e.g., Ireland,
2001; Smets and Wouters, 2002; or S¨ oderlind, 1999). This reﬂects the fact that
theoretical models contain many parameters that are redundant when it comes to
5There remains a diﬀerence between the discretionary outcome and that under commitment,
however: because discretionary policy cannot exploit private agents’ expectations, it is less eﬃ-
cient in stabilizing the economy than the optimal policy under commitment. This ineﬃciency of
discretionary policy has been termed “stabilization bias” (see Svensson, 1997, or Woodford, 1999),
and is analyzed in detail by Dennis and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2002).
6These parameter values were estimated by Rudebusch (2002a) using OLS on quarterly U.S.
data for the period 1968Q3–1996Q4 (with survey data for inﬂation expectations). Stability tests
typically cannot reject the hypothesis of no structural breaks in such estimated equations (Rude-
busch and Svensson, 1999; Rudebusch, 2002a; Dennis, 2001b); thus the estimates are likely to be
approximately valid also for our shorter sample period. Rudebusch also estimates the value of
µπ to 0.29, but restricts µy to zero. Similar estimates for the α and β parameters are obtained
restricting also µπ to zero (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Rudebusch, 2001), or using FIML or
SUR techniques (Dennis, 2001b).
6ﬁtting the model to data, and that estimation techniques are sensitive to outliers.
Rather than trying to ﬁnd a single “best” estimate for the parameters of interest, we
therefore choose to locate a range of parameter values which are broadly consistent
with the data. Our approach to calibration is however relatively ambitious and
is similar to GMM, except that our objective is to pick out a range of parameter
combinations with almost equal ﬁt. A GMM approach to matching the moments of
interest gives virtually identical results.7 In fact, we regard it as a useful alternative
to methods that focus on one single “best” parameter combination.
We thus calibrate the parameter vector (λ,ν,µπ,µ y,σ π,σ y) to match the styl-
ized facts of the U.S. economy presented in Table 1. This calibration is per-
formed using a grid search over a broad range of parameter values. The grid
search goes through all combinations of λ,ν ∈{ 0,0.1,0.25,0.5,1,2,5}; µπ,µ y ∈
{0.001,0.1,0.25,0.5,0.75,0.9,1};a n dσπ,σ y ∈{ 0.1,0.15,0.25,0.5,0.75,1,1.25},r e -
sulting in 117,649 conﬁgurations. For each conﬁguration we calculate the optimal
discretionary policy rule and the resulting unconditional moments (standard devi-
ations and autocorrelations) of inﬂation, output and the interest rate.8 We then
compare these model standard deviations and autocorrelations with those in actual
U.S. data, and pick out the conﬁgurations that match the data most closely.
In the end, we choose to identify those conﬁgurations where the standard de-
viations and autocorrelations of inﬂation, output, and the interest rate lie within
±1.25 standard errors from the values in the actual U.S. data. This procedure
results in eight parameter conﬁgurations, shown in Table 4. For comparison, the ta-
ble also includes a parameterization that is more common in the literature,9 where
(λ,ν,µπ,µ y)=( 1 .0,0.5,0.25,0.25), but the shock variances are left at their cali-
brated values (σπ,σ y)=( 0 .75,0.5). Our results indicate that in order to match the
time-series behavior of U.S. data, our model needs to be characterized by
• a fairly small preference for output stabilization: λ ≤ 0.10;
• a large preference for interest rate smoothing: 0.5 ≤ ν ≤ 2;
7In the GMM estimation we minimize the function (ξj − ˆ ξ) (ξj − ˆ ξ) over our grid of parameter
conﬁgurations, where ξj is the vector of moments for conﬁguration j and ˆ ξ is the vector of moments
in the data. All conﬁgurations in Table 4 are among the 25 best conﬁgurations according to this
criterion, and the other conﬁgurations are qualitatively very similar.
8Appendix A shows how to use standard methods to calculate the optimal policy rule, the
reduced form of the model, and the variance-covariance matrices of the state variables.
9The values for λ and ν in the “typical” parameterization are used as a benchmark by Rudebusch
and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2001), while the values for µπ and µy are similar to those
used by Rudebusch (2002a).
7Table 4: Calibrated parameter conﬁgurations
Conﬁg. No. λνµ π µy σπ σy
10 .00 1.00 0.10 0.50 0.75 0.50
20 .00 2.00 0.001 0.75 0.75 0.15
30 .00 2.00 0.001 0.75 0.75 0.25
40 .00 2.00 0.001 0.75 0.75 0.50
50 .00 2.00 0.001 0.90 0.75 0.50
60 .10 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.75 0.50
70 .10 1.00 0.001 0.75 0.75 0.50
80 .10 1.00 0.001 0.90 0.75 0.50
Typical 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.50
Parameter values calibrated to match moments in U.S. data. The parameterizations all imply
unconditional moments within ±1.25 standard errors from moments in the data.
• a small degree of forward-looking behavior in price-setting: µπ ≤ 0.1; and
• a large degree of forward-looking behavior in consumption/aggregate demand:
µy ≥ 0.5.
Some of these calibrated parameter values may seem extreme by conventional
standards. In theoretical analyses, authors often assume a larger preference for
output stability than for interest rate smoothing, as in the typical conﬁguration in
Table 4. Instead, our calibration indicates that central bank behavior (at least that
of the Federal Reserve) is dominated by a preference for interest rate smoothing
rather than output stability.
However, this result ﬁnds some support in the empirical literature. Dennis
(2001b) estimates the preference parameters of the Federal Reserve using full in-
formation maximum likelihood (FIML) for the period 1979–2000, and obtains esti-
mates of (λ,ν)=( 0 .23,12.3).10 Favero and Rovelli (2001) use GMM for the period
1980–98 and obtain (λ,ν)=( 0 .00125,0.0085). The diﬀerences between these results
seem to be mainly due to Favero and Rovelli (2001) using a ﬁnite policy horizon
(of four quarters), while Dennis (2001b) uses an inﬁnite horizon (as in our model).
Nevertheless, both studies ﬁnd a more important role for interest rate smoothing
than for output stabilization, as in our calibration.
10Matching the volatility of inﬂation, output, and the change in the interest rate, Dennis obtains
(λ,ν)=( 0 .46,0.74), but this parameterization implies a variance of the interest rate which is
almost twice as large as in the data (Dennis, 2001b, Appendix 2).
8The calibrated degrees of forward-looking behavior in inﬂation and output deter-
mination are perhaps less controversial. It is often argued that the purely forward-
looking speciﬁcation of the New-Keynesian model (with µπ = µy = 1) is at odds
with the data (Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002), and there is a large literature estimat-
ing versions of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve in equation (2). Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) argue that the backward-looking term is not quantitatively important, but
many other analyses tend to favor primarily backward-looking speciﬁcations, and
estimate µπ to be between 0.1 and 0.4, depending on sample period and estimation
technique.11 Lind´ e (2002) estimates versions of equations (2) and (3) on quarterly
U.S. data for 1960–97, and obtains µπ =0 .28 and µy =0 .43. Using a model similar
to ours with optimal discretionary policy, Lansing and Trehan (2001) ﬁnd that a
large µy is a suﬃcient condition for the coeﬃcients in the optimal policy rule to
match the standard Taylor rule coeﬃcients.
For our calibrated parameter conﬁgurations, Table 5 shows the standard devia-
tions and autocorrelations, along with the moments of the data. Inﬂation and the
interest rate are slightly more volatile than in the data, while the output gap is
slightly more stable. In terms of autocorrelations, the calibrated parameterizations
are very close to the actual data. In the more typical parameterization, inﬂation
is too volatile and too persistent compared with the data, the output gap is too
stable and the interest rate is much too volatile. Thus, our favored parameteriza-
tions are considerably more successful than more commonly used parameterizations
in describing the behavior of all three variables.
To illustrate the behavior of the calibrated model, Figure 2 shows how the econ-
omy responds to unit shocks to the three variables at t = 0, using a “baseline”
parameter conﬁguration given by conﬁguration No. 6 in Table 4. Although we have
chosen not to match the cross-correlations in the data, these impulse responses look
quite reasonable. After an interest rate disturbance12 (in the ﬁrst row), the interest
rate is slowly moved back to neutral, and returns after four quarters. By construc-
tion (see equations (2)–(3)), there is no immediate response of inﬂation or output
to the policy shock, but from t = 1 onwards, the output gap responds more quickly
than inﬂation. The maximum eﬀect on output (approximately −0.35%) comes after
11See, e.g., Fuhrer (1997), Roberts (2001), Rudd and Whelan (2001), Lind´ e (2002), or Jondeau
and Le Bihan (2001).
12The interest rate disturbance is not part of the model, since the interest rate is set optimally.
Nevertheless, an artiﬁcial interest rate shock can be constructed by assuming that the interest rate
is unexpectedly raised by one percentage point for one period, and that the system follows the
reduced-form afterwards (as in Svensson, 2000). See Appendix B for details.
9Table 5: Standard deviations and autocorrelations in actual data and model
Conﬁg. No. Standard Autocorrelations
deviation 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags
(a) Inﬂation: πt
Data 1.04 0.65 0.53 0.54
Calibrated 11 .10 0.69 0.49 0.51
21 .13 0.70 0.51 0.55
31 .14 0.71 0.51 0.55
41 .14 0.71 0.51 0.55
51 .13 0.70 0.50 0.55
61 .10 0.69 0.49 0.51
71 .14 0.71 0.51 0.55
81 .13 0.70 0.50 0.55
Typical 1.28 0.77 0.64 0.66
(b) Output gap: yt
Data 1.67 0.91 0.83 0.75
Calibrated 11 .57 0.91 0.77 0.65
21 .48 0.96 0.90 0.83
31 .50 0.95 0.88 0.81
41 .57 0.89 0.80 0.74
51 .54 0.86 0.79 0.73
61 .49 0.89 0.75 0.62
71 .53 0.88 0.78 0.72
81 .51 0.85 0.78 0.72
Typical 1.06 0.84 0.62 0.43
(c) Interest rate: it
Data 1.51 0.94 0.86 0.74
Calibrated 11 .67 0.97 0.90 0.81
21 .57 0.99 0.95 0.90
31 .57 0.99 0.95 0.90
41 .58 0.99 0.95 0.90
51 .56 0.99 0.96 0.91
61 .71 0.96 0.89 0.79
71 .64 0.98 0.94 0.89
81 .63 0.99 0.95 0.90
Typical 2.04 0.93 0.80 0.66
Unconditional moments with calibrated parameters. The typical conﬁguration is given by
(λ,ν,µπ,µ y,σ π,σ y)=( 1 .0,0.5,0.25,0.25,0.75,0.5).
10Figure 2: Impulse responses in baseline model
Unit shocks. Baseline parameter values: (λ,ν,µπ,µ y,σ π,σ y)=( 0 .1,0.5,0.1,0.5,0.75,0.5).
two quarters, while that on inﬂation (approximately −0.10%) comes later, after four
to six quarters. This pattern is similar to that obtained from typical VAR models
of the U.S. economy (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 1999).
After shocks to inﬂation and output, monetary policy responds only gradually,
since the central bank dislikes large swings in the interest rate (ν is large).13 After an
inﬂation disturbance, the monetary policy response opens up a negative output gap,
which is then closed very slowly (since the weight on output stabilization λ is small).
After an output disturbance, the central bank must change the positive output gap
into a negative gap in order to ﬁght the inﬂationary impulse, and this is done fairly
quickly (again because of the small λ). In both cases the quarterly inﬂation rate
displays a rather volatile pattern, partly due to the fact that the central bank aims
at stabilizing annual inﬂation.
This analysis indicates that our calibrated model provides a reasonable descrip-
tion of the U.S. economy. In contrast, a parameterization that is more common
in the literature is clearly at odds with the data when describing the behavior of
13Note that the central bank aims to stabilize annual inﬂation rather than quarterly inﬂation
(which is shown in the ﬁgure), and annual inﬂation of course responds more slowly to the distur-
bance than does quarterly inﬂation. The central bank therefore responds more slowly than would
have been the case with a target for quarterly inﬂation (cf. Ness´ en, 2002).
11output and the interest rate. The next section provides intuition for these results
by more carefully scrutinizing the calibrated parameterizations.
4 Inspecting the mechanism: The key parameters
To some extent, the empirical literature gives support for our calibrated parameter
conﬁgurations. However, this literature typically does not provide much intuition
for the ﬁnal choice of parameters. In contrast, since our approach aims at match-
ing moments from diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations with those in actual data, it
is straightforward to examine the consequences of alternative parameterizations.
Because we jointly calibrate several parameters, we will also demonstrate how vari-
ations in a parameter in one equation aﬀects the moments of another variable.
In this section we depart from the baseline conﬁguration (No. 6 in Tables 4–5)
in one parameter dimension at a time and calculate the resulting standard devia-
tion and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of inﬂation, output and the interest rate.14 This
exercise is intended to explain the calibration in detail, and also to reveal the extent
to which the diﬀerent parameters contribute to the overall ﬁt of the model. The re-
sults are reported in Figures 3–5. In each ﬁgure, vertical lines represent the baseline
parameter values, and the three stars represent the moments of the actual data.
For the central bank’s preference parameters, we would a priori expect that
increasing the weight of one variable in the objective function would make that vari-
able more stable and less persistent, since the central bank will act more strongly to
oﬀset the eﬀects of shocks on that particular variable. For the other variables, one
would expect the opposite pattern. Figure 3a–b shows that this intuition holds when
varying the weight on output stabilization, λ.A sλ increases (keeping the other pa-
rameters ﬁxed), output becomes more stable and less persistent, while inﬂation and
(to some extent) the interest rate become more volatile and more persistent. For in-
ﬂation and output, increasing λ makes the standard deviation and autocorrelations
move away from the values in the data, leading to a worse ﬁt of the model. Decreas-
ing λ towards zero has no important eﬀect on the behavior of any variable; since ν
is large, a zero weight on output stabilization does not lead to much volatility in the
interest rate and output, as would have been the case with ν = 0. Thus, Figure 3
indicates that larger values of λ than in our calibrated conﬁgurations imply too high
volatility and persistence of inﬂation and too low volatility and persistence of output
14The higher-order autocorrelations give the same qualitative picture as ﬁrst-order autocorrela-
tions.
12Figure 3: Varying preference parameters from the baseline conﬁguration
Unconditional standard deviations and ﬁrst-order autocorrelations as the weight on output sta-
bilization λ (upper panels) and interest rate smoothing ν (lower panels) vary from the baseline
conﬁguration (No. 6 in Table 4). Vertical lines represent baseline values, stars represent moments
in actual data.
compared with U.S. data.
When it comes to the weight on interest rate smoothing, ν, Figure 3c–d reveal
that our intuition needs to be somewhat reﬁned. As ν is decreased from 0.5 towards
zero, inﬂation becomes more stable and the interest rate more volatile, in accordance
with the intuition. However, the volatility in output increases slightly: the direct
eﬀect of the increased interest rate volatility on output seems to dominate the larger
weight on output stability (relative to interest rate smoothing) in the objective
function. As ν falls, the standard deviation of inﬂation and output tend to approach
the data and the standard deviation of the interest rate moves away from the data.
The autocorrelation in all variables is not much aﬀected by the decrease in ν,a s
long as ν>0. As ν approaches zero, the interest rate becomes extremely volatile
(for ν = 0, its standard deviation is close to 8.5%), and the autocorrelation of the
interest rate approaches zero. Thus, smaller values of ν lead to excessive volatility
in the interest rate relative to the data.
As for the importance of forward-looking behavior in the determination of inﬂa-
tion and output, we would a priori expect that more forward-looking in the deter-
mination of one variable would make that variable less persistent, while it is diﬃcult
13Figure 4: Varying the degree of forward-looking behavior from the baseline conﬁg-
uration
Unconditional standard deviations and ﬁrst-order autocorrelations as the degree of forward-looking
behavior in inﬂation µπ (upper panels) and in output µy (lower panels) vary from the baseline
conﬁguration (No. 6 in Table 4). Vertical lines represent baseline values, stars represent moments
in actual data.
to predict the eﬀects on volatility. Figure 4a–b shows that increasing µπ quickly re-
duces the persistence in inﬂation, but also output and the interest rate become less
persistent. At the same time the volatility in all variables falls, with a particularly
large eﬀect on the interest rate. For all variables this decrease in volatility and per-
sistence tends to move the model moments away from those found in the data. As
µπ approaches unity (a common case in the theoretical literature), the interest rate
becomes very stable, and the autocorrelation of inﬂation approaches zero. While
the previous literature has focused on the need for backward-looking elements in
inﬂation to match the persistence of inﬂation, our results show that a small degree
of forward-looking is needed also to match the behavior of output and the interest
rate. Thus, larger values of µπ than in our calibration imply too low volatility of
output and the interest rate and too low persistence of inﬂation and output.
Figure 4c–d show that a larger degree of forward-looking in output makes the
output gap less volatile and persistent, but here the eﬀects are very small. As µy falls
also inﬂation and the interest rate become more volatile, and the standard deviation
of inﬂation and the interest rate move away from the values in the data. This eﬀect is
14Figure 5: Varying the standard deviation of shocks from the baseline conﬁguration
Unconditional standard deviations and ﬁrst-order autocorrelations as the standard deviation of
inﬂation shocks σπ (upper panels) and output shocks σy (lower panels) vary from the baseline
conﬁguration (No. 6 in Table 4). Vertical lines represent baseline values, stars represent moments
in actual data.
particularly strong for the volatility of the interest rate, which increases considerably
as µy falls. Indeed, letting µy approach zero has no important eﬀect on inﬂation
or output, while it leads to a very volatile interest rate (with a standard deviation
of 3.7% when µy = 0). As output (and consumption) becomes more inertial and
less forward-looking, larger movements in the interest rate are needed to persuade
consumers to adjust.15 We conclude that smaller values of µy lead to excessive
volatility in the interest rate and inﬂation relative to the data. Surprisingly, the
behavior of output is not much aﬀected by changes in µy.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the eﬀects of varying the standard deviation of inﬂation
and output shocks. While increasing σπ leads to more volatility in all variables,
increasing σy only aﬀects the volatility in output. This reﬂects the fact that supply
shocks pose a more serious trade-oﬀ to policymakers, who must contract output to
decrease inﬂation. Demand shocks, on the other hand, are more easily mitigated.
It is thus clear from Figure 5 that the calibrated value of σπ serves to match the
15This is consistent with Lansing and Trehan (2001), who argue that a small degree of forward-
looking in output leads to very aggressive policy behavior, i.e., large coeﬃcients in an optimized
Taylor-type rule.
15volatility in all variables whereas σy is chosen to match the volatility in output.
While the main purpose of this section was to explain the parameters resulting
from our calibration exercise, the discussion has also highlighted some important
aspects of this class of models. When the economy is given by a system of simulta-
neous equations, the largest eﬀects of changing a given parameter in one equation
may well be on the behavior of some other variable in the system. Our results make
clear that to explain the behavior of the interest rate (and thus monetary policy)
we need not only a large weight on interest rate smoothing, but also a fairly large
degree of forward-looking behavior in the determination of output and a small de-
gree of forward-looking in price-setting. The time-series properties of inﬂation can
be explained only if our model includes a small degree of forward-looking behavior
in price-setting (as noted elsewhere), but also a small weight on output stabilization
and a large degree of forward-looking behavior in output. Finally, to match the
behavior of the output gap we need a small weight on output stabilization and a
small degree of forward-looking in price-setting, while the degree of forward-looking
in output is less important. These results strengthen the argument that results
from single-equation analyses may not be suﬃcient to pin down the value of any one
parameter; a systems approach is often more appropriate.
5 Robustness issues
Our calibration in the previous sections is conditioned on a number of choices re-
garding data, parameter values, model speciﬁcation and matching criteria. This
section discusses the extent to which these choices aﬀect our calibration results.
First, our calibrated parameter conﬁgurations are chosen so that the moments
of the model lie within ±1.25 standard errors from those in the data. Figure 6
shows how the calibrated parameter values vary as the range varies from ±1t o±3.5
standard errors. This gives an idea of the robustness of the diﬀerent parameter
values. It seems that some parameter values are more robust than others: when we
increase the accepted range, the set of some parameter values grows faster than for
other values. Up to ±1.5 standard errors, the results are very much the same as in
our preferred calibrations, while above ±2 standard errors, ν and µy cover almost
the entire permitted interval (except ν = 0). However, ν = 0 is only picked out for
±3.25 standard errors; loosely speaking the hypothesis of no interest rate smoothing
is “rejected” using any reasonable level of signiﬁcance.
Second, while calibrating the model to match data from 1987 to 1999, we use
16Figure 6: Parameter ranges for varying criteria
17Table 6: Parameter values, 1987–2001
Inﬂation Output gap
απ1 0.282 βy1 1.229
απ2 −0.025 βy2 −0.244
απ3 0.292 βr 0.073
απ4 0.385
αy 0.141
Note: Parameters estimated by Castelnuovo (2002) on quarterly U.S. data, 1987Q3–2001Q1. The
parameters µπ and µy are restricted to zero.
some parameter estimates from the period 1968–1996. The latter period includes the
period of high and variable inﬂation during the 1970s, so if the parameters estimated
by Rudebusch (2002a) are not truly structural, they may not be representative
for the more recent sample period. As an alternative, Table 6 shows parameter
estimates obtained by Castelnuovo (2002) when estimating the purely backward-
looking version of the model (µπ = µy = 0) for the sample 1987Q3–2001Q1. The
main diﬀerence from the values in Table 3 relates to the autoregressive parameters
in the Phillips curve: in the more recent sample the weights on lagged inﬂation are
shifted somewhat towards the longer lags than when including also the earlier period.
Using these parameter values, we obtain similar results for λ, σπ and σy, even larger
values for ν (above 2), and smaller values for µy (around 0.25). Most interestingly,
this calibration results in inﬂation being either purely backward-looking (µπ =0 )
or, more often, purely forward-looking (µπ = 1). This suggests that the parameters
in the inﬂation and output equations are important when calibrating the degree of
forward-looking behavior, but less so when determining the preference parameters
of the central bank.
A third issue concerns the measurement of the output gap. It is rather standard
in the literature to deﬁne the output gap as the deviation of real GDP from potential,
calculated by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce. However, the CBO’s methodology
to calculate potential output leads to a rather smooth series, and so may exaggerate
the volatility of the output gap. The results in Section 4 suggest that calibrating
the model to match a less volatile output gap would imply a slightly larger λ and
µπ and a smaller σπ. Still, since the standard deviation of the output gap is not
the only moment that ties down the calibration (the small value of λ is also related
to the volatility of inﬂation and the persistence in the output gap), our qualitative
results are unlikely to be very sensitive to the choice of output gap measure.
Fourth, estimated Taylor rules are often used to discuss the issue of interest
18rate smoothing. However, Section 3 focuses on matching only the volatility of key
economic variables, not the coeﬃcients in the Taylor rule. If instead we try to match
the estimated rule in Table 2 our calibration yields virtually any value for λ, while
for ν,µπ and µy the basic results from the previous calibration remain unaltered. In
particular, we still get a large value for ν: to match the degree of persistence in the
Taylor rule, we must allow for a very large weight on interest rate smoothing (even
larger than in Section 3). Furthermore, the preference for interest rate smoothing
is always at least as large as the preference for output stabilization.
Finally, in addition to introducing more lags to the theoretical version of the
New-Keynesian model, the Rudebusch (2002a) model also uses a slightly diﬀerent
dating of expectations. While this seemingly innocent speciﬁcation is rather common
in empirical modeling (see, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, or Christiano
et al., 2001), it has important consequences for the dynamics of the model (Dennis
and S¨ oderstr¨ om, 2002). We therefore examine also the more standard dating of
expectations using the speciﬁcation
πt = µπEt¯ πt+3 +( 1− µπ)
4  
j=1
απjπt−j + αyyt−1 + εt, (5)
yt = µyEtyt+1 +( 1− µy)
2  
j=1
βyjyt−j − βr [it−1 − Et−1¯ πt+3]+ηt. (6)
Calibrating this model gives virtually identical results to those in Section 3, the
main diﬀerence being that this calibration always yields λ =0a n dν>1.
These robustness exercises suggest that the results for the degree of forward-
looking in inﬂation and output may not be entirely robust: some alternative cali-
brations favor parameterizations with a large degree of forward-looking in inﬂation
and a fairly small degree of forward-looking in output. The parameters governing
central bank behavior, on the other hand, seem very robust. Although some cal-
ibrations yield a larger preference for output stabilization than in Section 3, the
preference for interest rate smoothing is always at least as large as (and in most
parameterizations many times larger than) the weight on output stabilization.
6 Concluding remarks
The main purpose of this paper has been to examine whether a suitably calibrated
New-Keynesian model of optimal discretionary monetary policy can match some
broad characteristics of the U.S. economy. This is an important issue, since cali-
19brated models of this kind are frequently used to analyze monetary policy and as a
basis for policy recommendations. Our analysis shows that it is indeed possible to
match some important stylized facts using a model with New-Keynesian features,
but empirically relevant calibrations entail some controversial parameter values.
First, frequently used calibrated models often assume that the central bank’s
objective function is characterized by a low preference for interest rate smoothing.
Our results show—like some earlier papers—that this makes it hard to match the
low volatility of the interest rate in actual data.
Second, a standard assumption is that it is appropriate to assume that the cen-
tral bank has a relatively strong preference for output stabilization. We ﬁnd that
unless there is a small (virtually zero) preference for output stabilization, our New-
Keynesian model can hardly match the low volatility and persistence in inﬂation,
or the high volatility and persistence in the output gap.
A third result from our exercises is that a large degree of backward-looking
behavior in the Phillips curve is needed to match the high persistence in inﬂation.
This is well known from earlier studies. But since these studies have often focused on
the time series properties of inﬂation, it has not been noted that backward-looking
behavior in inﬂation is important also for explaining the volatility and persistence
of output and the interest rate.
Finally, we ﬁnd that an empirically relevant New-Keynesian model needs a fairly
large degree of forward-looking behavior in the aggregate demand equation. Specif-
ically, this is needed to match the low volatility in the interest rate: with a more
persistent output gap, larger interest rate movements are needed to aﬀect aggregate
demand.
Although our preferred parameter values diﬀer from those typically used in the
literature, they are by no means counter-intuitive. The tradition to work with
models with a relatively strong preference for output stability and a weak preference
for interest rate smoothing (a high λ in relation to ν) does not seem to be based
on economic theory. Rather, it seems to be based on the simple observation that
central banks do not pursue “strict” inﬂation targeting (so λ and ν are not both
zero): inﬂation is too persistent and interest rates are too stable to be consistent with
“strict” inﬂation targeting. Our results suggest that it is better to describe “ﬂexible”
monetary policy as reﬂecting a preference for interest rate smoothing rather than
output stability.
There are good reasons to believe that central banks have an interest rate smooth-
ing objective in addition to their preferences for price stability. A preference for in-
20terest rate smoothing can be motivated by central bank concerns about stability on
ﬁnancial markets and the payment system in particular.16 Listening to central bank
rhetoric also gives the impression that ﬁnancial stability is a more important objec-
tive than output stability. During the disinﬂation that many developed countries
have experienced since the early 1980s, central banks have been rather unwilling
to admit that they care about output stability. Meanwhile, there have been many
actions taken with the explicit intent to promote ﬁnancial stability (see Estrella,
2001, for an overview).
It should be stressed that much work remains before central banks’ responsibility
for ﬁnancial stability and payment system stability can be analyzed using formal
models with both good micro-foundations and empirical support. A relatively large
weight on interest rate smoothing in relation to output stability in a quadratic loss
function is of course a very crude way to model central banks’ behavior. Further-
more, central banks do not seem to behave in the linear way assumed in our model
and most other analyses of monetary policy. Rather, they seem to change interest
rates in a step-wise fashion, and the most common policy decision is to leave the
instrument rate unchanged. The rationale for such a policy remains to be discov-
ered, but it does imply a high degree of interest rate smoothing. What we suggest
is that, within the linear-quadratic framework commonly applied, policy should be
described in terms of a high ν in relation to λ, not the other way around. We think
that earlier exercises with calibrated models may have missed this point because
they have paid too little attention to the time-series properties of nominal interest
rates (in relation to, e.g., inﬂation).
We do not think that the relatively high degree of forward-looking behavior in the
aggregate demand relation is unreasonable either. The microfoundations of the ag-
gregate demand equation stem from the representative individual’s desire to smooth
consumption over time (an Euler equation). With the deregulations and innovations
in ﬁnancial markets that have taken place since the 1980s, it has become easier for
households to smooth their consumption over time and to implement the forward-
looking behavior that would be optimal in the absence of credit market restrictions.
The growing interest of the general public in the development of the stock market
also suggests that consumption plans nowadays are largely forward-looking. The
low degree of forward-looking in the aggregate supply equation suggested by our
16See, e.g., Cukierman (1991) and Goodfriend (1991). Lorenzoni (2001) presents a theoretical
analysis of the dual objectives of price stability and payment system stability, and their connection
to interest rate smoothing.
21results is more diﬃcult to understand. It has been recognized earlier that this may
be needed to make the New-Keynesian model consistent with the data, but there is
no convincing theoretical argument for a very low µπ.
Our results suggest that policy recommendations and other conclusions based
on New-Keynesian models with parameter values that have now become standard
should be taken with a grain of salt. Before such exercises are discussed seriously,
the consistency between the calibrated models and reality needs more careful ex-
amination. Steps in this direction, in the form of econometrically estimated New-
Keynesian models of aggregate supply, aggregate demand and monetary policy, have
recently been presented by Dennis (2001b), Favero and Rovelli (2001), and Lind´ e
(2002). Their results are not entirely consistent, however, and more work along
these lines is clearly needed.
22A Model appendix




Et [πt+1 + πt+2 + πt+3 + πt+4] (A1)
+(1− µπ)[απ1πt + απ2πt−1 + απ3πt−2 + απ4πt−3]+αyyt + εt+1,
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Then solve for the forward-looking variables Etπt+4 and Etyt+2 and take expectations
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, (A4)
and reintroduce the disturbances via the (predetermined) variables
πt+1 =E tπt+1 + εt+1, (A5)
yt+1 =E tyt+1 + ηt+1. (A6)
Deﬁne an (n1 × 1) vector (n1 = 11) of predetermined state variables as17
x1t = {πt,π t−1,π t−2,π t−3,y t,y t−1,y t−2,y t−3,i t−1,i t−2,i t−3}
  , (A7)
an (n2 × 1) vector (n2 = 4) of forward-looking jump variables as
x2t = {Etπt+1,Etπt+2,Etπt+3,Etyt+1}
  , (A8)





















 + B1it + vt+1, (A10)
17The additional lags of the output gap and the interest rate are not state variables, but are








and where the matrices A0, A1 and B1 contain the parameters of the model. The





















 + Bit + vt+1, (A12)
where A = A
−1
0 A1 and B = A
−1
0 B1.19
To write the central bank’s objective function (4), it is convenient to deﬁne a
vector of target variables as
zt = {¯ πt,y t,∆it}
  , (A13)
which can be calculated by
zt = Cxxt + Ciit. (A14)
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tRit, (A16)
18This means that A0 must be non-singular, i.e., µπ,µ y  =0 .
19Note that A
−1
0 vt+1 = vt+1 since A0 is block diagonal with an identity matrix as its upper left
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tRit + δEtJ(xt+1)}, (A21)
subject to the transition equation (A12), and the optimal policy rule can be calcu-
lated using standard methods (see S¨ oderlind, 1999, for an overview).
The optimal policy under discretion is a rule for the interest rate as a linear
function of the predetermined variables:
it = Fx 1t, (A22)
resulting in the reduced form
x1t+1 = Mx1t + v1t+1, (A23)
x2t = Nx1t. (A24)
See S¨ oderlind (1999) for details. The target variables in zt then follow
zt = Cx1t, (A25)
where
C = Cx1 + Cx2N + CiF. (A26)
The reduced form (A23) implies that the unconditional variance-covariance ma-
trix of x1t satisﬁes
Σx1 = MΣx1M
  +Σ v1, (A27)
and using the vec operator and solving for vec(Σx1), we get
vec(Σx1)=( I − M ⊗ M)
−1 vec(Σv1). (A28)
25The covariance matrix of x2t is then given by
Σx2 = NΣx1N
 , (A29)
and that of zt is
Σz = CΣx1C
 . (A30)
B Responses to an interest rate shock
In order to model a monetary policy shock, i.e., a one-time shock to the interest
rate, suppose the central bank changes the interest rate at time t =0b ydit,a n d
from then on follows its optimal policy rule it = Fx 1t for all t>0. How does the
economy respond to such a shock?
Note ﬁrst that the predetermined variables in x1t do not respond to a change in
it,s odx1t = 0. The forward-looking variables in x2t, on the other hand, respond
immediately. But the response of x2t depends on the response of Etx2t+1. Partition
A and B conformably with x1t and x2t. Then the response of Etx2t+1 is, using (A24)
and (A12),
dEtx2t+1 = NdEtx1t+1
= N [A11dx1t + A12dx2t + B1dit]. (B1)
From (A12) we also get
dEtx2t+1 = A21dx1t + A22dx2t + B2dit. (B2)
Combining these expressions and using dx1t =0w eg e t
dx2t =[ A22 − NA12]
−1 [NB1 − B2]dit. (B3)
The variables in x1t+1 then respond by
dx1t+1 = A12dx2t + B1dit
=
 
A12 [A22 − NA12]
−1 [NB1 − B2]+B1
 
dit, (B4)
and from then on the system follows (A23) and (A24).
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